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Abstract
This paper examines the situation of a subgroup of non-citizens found in virtually all
contemporary states, what I call “precarious residents”.  Precarious residents can be defined as
non-citizens living in the state that possess few social, political or economic rights, are highly
vulnerable to deportation, and have little or no option for making secure their immigration status.
The archetypal precarious resident is the undocumented (or unlawful) migrant. However, there
are many other barely tolerated individuals who also fit the appellation, such as asylum seekers
(including ones whose claims have been rejected), guest workers, and individuals with temporary
protection from deportation. I begin this paper by exploring the nature of precarious residence,
discussing its dimensions, causes and manifestations in different national contexts. I move then
to consider the human development consequences of precarious residence before exploring the
question of the responsibilities of states to protect the rights and, in some cases, recognize the
membership claims of these non-citizens.
Keywords: immigration, citizenship, non-citizens, rights, undocumented migration, temporary
workers, ethics, human rights, asylum, integration, internally displaced persons.
The Human Development Research Paper (HDRP) Series is a medium for sharing recent
research commissioned to inform the global Human Development Report, which is published
annually, and further research in the field of human development. The HDRP Series is a quick-
disseminating, informal publication whose titles could subsequently be revised for publication as
articles in professional journals or chapters in books. The authors include leading academics and
practitioners from around the world, as well as UNDP researchers. The findings, interpretations
and conclusions are strictly those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of
UNDP or United Nations Member States. Moreover, the data may not be consistent with that
presented in Human Development Reports.
1Introduction
Most migration is driven by inequalities between states or regions. People move because they
seek better economic opportunities for themselves and their families or, as with refugees, they
seek a country in which they can enjoy basic rights and security. But migration is not simply a
consequence of inequality in a world where life chances, security and economic opportunities are
unevenly distributed across states, it is also a cause of inequalities.
Migration may create internal inequalities in a number of different ways. It can introduce to a
state people who have spent most of their lives in a poorer country with little opportunity to
accumulate the capital or resources commonly held by established residents. Alternatively, the
act of migration itself may be expensive, making new arrivals relatively poorer and debt-laden
than citizens. But some of the most important inequalities generated by contemporary migration
are not economic but political. The movement of people between sovereign jurisdictions usually
(with the exception of dual nationals) involves migrants moving from a country where they hold
full membership, to one where they do not. Migration thus creates non-citizens: people who live
under the authority of a state of which they are not a member and thus not entitled to the rights
reserved for citizens.
Every one of the world’s states—from the richest to the poorest; from the most democratic to the
most authoritarian—is constituted at any moment by a mixture of citizens and non-citizens.
Ironically, the significance of this distinction may be greatest in the world’s wealthiest states
because they provide the most wide-ranging entitlements to members (including social
protection, access to welfare, etc.) The more developed the country, then, the more consequential
it may be, in relative terms, to be a noncitizen.
The inequalities generated by migration are perhaps most obvious in the case of international
movement. However, in many situations, moving across internal jurisdictions within a state can
also transform a citizen into a guest, or, perhaps more accurately, into a second class citizen,
resulting in the reduction of their rights, either temporarily or permanently.  In some Nigerian
provinces, for example, only indigenous members may run for office, a situation that excludes
2citizens who move there from other parts of the country (Bach 1997). On a much larger scale,
many of the world’s internally displaced persons (IDPs) find that some of their basic rights are
no longer recognised or protected when they move within their own country to avoid persecution
or conflict (See, for example, Forced Migration Review, 2005).
Whilst movement out of a country of citizenship creates non-citizens, the consequences for the
rights, capabilities and human development more generally of migrants, vary greatly amongst
different groups and in different national contexts. Some non-citizens, such as highly skilled
migrants moving to Western countries or EU citizens transferring between EU states, may be
granted an array of rights, entitlements and privileges upon arrival that make them difficult to
distinguish legally from citizens. Rights to welfare, to bring members of one’s family, to work,
to choose one’s employer, to secure residence, and even the right to vote in local elections may
be available. The existence of such an extensive array of formal rights does not, of course,
guarantee that a migrant will be able to shape his or her own destiny in the new country. But
these rights provide a set of tools and a firm social and political standing that makes rapid and
successful social integration more likely.
By contrast, some non-citizens may, upon entering a state, find themselves with hardly any rights
at all, including the right to reside legally in the state. As well as possessing a lowly social and
political status, these migrants may be socially segregated from other members of society with
few opportunities for transferring their status to one with more extensive rights and entitlements.
Migration, in this case, may still bring some benefits, like new earning opportunities, but it may
also lead individuals into exploitation, abuse, and diminished economic and social opportunities
in the longer term.
Such non-citizens are the subject of this paper. I will call them “precarious residents”. They can
be defined as people living in a state that possess few social, political or economic rights, are
highly vulnerable to deportation, and have little or no option for making secure their immigration
status. The archetypal precarious resident, found in virtually all contemporary states, is the
undocumented immigrant, someone who resides in state territory unlawfully. However, there are
many other barely tolerated individuals who also fit the appellation, such as asylum seekers
3(including ones whose claims have been rejected), guest workers, and individuals with temporary
protection from deportation.
In its most extreme manifestations, the precarious resident is a modern variant of the stateless
men and women that Hannah Arendt so eloquently described in the late 1940s in her work, the
Origins of Totalitarianism. In Origins, Arendt described the stateless, a category which for her
included refugees, as “the most symptomatic group in contemporary politics” (1986, 277)
because their dire plight revealed the emptiness of  human rights (what she called “the Rights of
Man”) for those who lacked effective or formal membership in an actual nation state community.
The stateless were effectively expelled from humanity because the global spread of the nation
state had made “belonging to the community into which one is born no longer a matter of course
and not belonging no longer a matter of choice” (1986, 296). The issue of de jure statelessness
has receded in significance since Arendt wrote1, but globalising forces, revolutions in
transportation and communications, and the development of human rights law in the last few
decades, have made many of the world’s richest societies unwilling or ambivalent hosts to large
numbers of migrants who enter as temporary workers, undocumented migrants or asylum
seekers. These migrants are rarely formally stateless and are, in many cases, not refugees. The
problems they face stem not from the lack of a nationality; they cannot be said, unlike Arendt’s
stateless, to have been expelled from humanity altogether. Rather, they lack security, basic civil,
political and economic rights, and opportunities for membership in the countries to which they
have migrated. Their day to day experience may involve a kind of statelessness in the sense of an
effective absence of state protection that is linked to their being outside their country of
citizenship.
These “precarious residents” are some of the most vulnerable migrants in the world today.
Practically, they may have little or no standing to claim even basic rights because in the eyes of
state officials (and large sections of the public) they are trespassers with no right to be present in
the state in the first place or barely tolerated guests, people whom the state is willing or legally
obliged to host for a limited period (guest workers or asylum seekers) but who may not be seen
as fit for full membership. The rights they have are limited in order to ensure their departure now
                                                 
1 Importantly, it is has not disappeared altogether though. See Blitz (2006).
4or at some point in the future. In either case, their human development is profoundly shaped by
their immigration status. While they may formally possess a range of basic rights in relation to
the state, their ability to claim these rights is undermined by vulnerability to deportation. To put
in the terms of Amartya Sen (2001), their immigration status (or lack of one) becomes a key
constraint upon their development towards freedom and their ability turn the experience of
migration into one that expands their capabilities.
In this paper, I will explore the nature of precarious residence. As well as considering its
dimensions, causes and various manifestations in different national contexts, I will examine two
major questions: first, what are the implications of precarious residence for human development?
And, second, what rights are owed to non-citizens in this type of situation?
This paper is divided into eight parts. In the first, I explore the distinction between citizens and
non-citizens, considering recent developments in Western countries that have lessened the
division between the two; in the next, I look at philosophical or normative basis for this
distinction as it relates to border control. In the following section, I draw upon a range of
examples from around the globe to consider who precarious residents are, and what features they
share in common. In Section IV and V, I consider the dimensions and political and economic
uses of precarious residence for states. Next, I turn to examine the human development
consequences of precarious residence, drawing from the cases of particular groups discussed
earlier. In section VII, I look at different arguments for incorporating precarious residents into
citizenship in the countries where they live. This paper concludes with a discussion of the
measures that might be implemented to improve the situation precarious residents.
I. The practical significance of citizenship
It has been widely noted by scholars that in many Western countries, the gap between the rights
of citizens and non-citizens has greatly diminished in recent decades (Soysal 1994, Joppke 1999,
Hansen 2000). In Western European countries, like Germany, France, and the UK, many rights
once granted solely to citizens are now available to noncitizen residents, including full access to
social security and welfare systems, protections against deportation, rights of family
5reunification, and the ability to vote in local elections. This development has led to some to argue
that citizenship is waning as a source of rights and entitlements (Soysal 1994). As citizenship’s
role as a distinctive source of rights has decreased, so arguably has its attractiveness. It is unclear
why resident non-citizens should desire citizenship when the status carries few privileges or
rights that now cannot already claim.
How should we explain the decreasing significance of citizenship? According to the scholar
Yaesmin Soysal, the closing of the gap between citizen and noncitizen rights is attributable to the
influence of post-national human rights norms. International and regional treaties, signed up to
by Western states, have been a powerful force in leading national courts, civil society, and
ultimately governments to expand the rights of non-members. For Soysal, it is personhood not
membership that is now the most important source of entitlements and protections in many
modern European states. We have moved into an era of what she calls “postnational citizenship”
(1994).  A more modest interpretation of recent developments is found in the work of scholars
like Christian Joppke (1999) and Randall Hansen (2000 & 2009). They concede that there has
been a closing of the rights gap between citizens and non-citizens across Western states in recent
years but attribute it to factors internal to these states, the force of a kind of “embedded
liberalism”. The internal liberal logic of Western states as manifested through civil society,
domestic constitutions and municipal courts has driven an expansion in noncitizen rights.
International law and treaties have been influential in expanding rights, however, only when they
have incorporated into municipal law.  In their view, the movement towards noncitizen rights
does not reflect any decrease in the significance of the sovereign state, still less the end of
citizenship; it is a product largely of an internal shift in power in liberal states from the executive
control of the rights of foreigners to the judicial activism and constitutional constraints (Hansen
2009).
The narrowing gap between citizen and noncitizen rights is an important development even if it
is one confined largely to Europe, North America and Australasia. However, its significance
should not be exaggerated.  One gets only a limited picture of the realities faced by immigrants
(non-citizens) by examining their formal legal entitlements or official discourses of legitimation
(Zolberg 1995). Racism, economic inequality, social segregation, can make the many of the
6rights nominally possessed even those who hold full formal membership in the state (citizens)
nugatory in practice. The consequences of these social realities may be even harsher for
noncitizen residents because their lack of status may itself act as a catalyst for hostile, inequitable
and exclusionary treatment.
Furthermore, even if many of the privileges once available solely to citizens are now legally
available to permanent residents in some countries, like green card holders in the US or those
with indefinite leave to remain in the UK, two other major citizenship goods, what I will call
voice and security, are usually enjoyed by them only on attenuated terms.  Voice (Shachar 2004)
involves the right to air in public fora views about the use and abuse of government power and
the direction of society, and to participate in (or to be elected to) political organisations that
fashion society’s direction and government policy. The sine qua non of citizenship is often thus
seen as embodied in key rights associated with voice, namely rights ‘to vote, hold elected and
appointed government offices, to sit on various sorts of juries, and generally to participate in
debates as equal community members’ (Smith 2002: 105). Again, of course, in some countries,
specifically, non-democratic ones, these goods are not necessarily available even to citizens. The
good of security, by contrast, is typically available to citizens even in poor or undemocratic
states. This good is evident in the fact that the possession of citizenship offers a unique level of
security of residence or presence in a state. Citizens, unlike non-citizens, typically cannot be
deported or expelled, making to their access to other goods enjoyed in the state uniquely robust
(Gibney and Hansen 2003; Goodwin-Gill 1978).  Moreover, they may leave and reenter the state
at will, and have a right to consular protection abroad.
Finally, it’s important to note that these changes have impacted unevenly on non-citizens, even
in advanced liberal democracies. Those included in the inner circle of rights have tended to be
permanent residents or green card holders, or very long term residents and their offspring (such
as the Turkish former guestworkers in Germany). At the same time as these groups have been
incorporated into citizen-style rights, the use of detention and deportation for other groups of
non-citizens (unlawful migrants, asylum seekers, etc.) has expanded across Western states
(Gibney 2009, Bosworth 2008). While many non-citizens certainly enjoy greater security and
have been granted more rights, for many other non-citizens deportation and detention are ever
7present realities, threatening to take away the little they may have gained by residence in the host
country and any hopes they may have had for the future.
II. The morality of citizenship
While the practical significance of recent gains in the rights of non-citizens vis à vis citizens can
be exaggerated, an important normative issue is raised by recent developments: is it morally
justifiable for citizens to have more extensive rights than non-citizens? Defenders of immigration
control have offered a range of different arguments for citizen control over borders, and
correspondingly control over the status and presence of non-citizens within the state. One
influential one derives the legitimacy of entrance control from the right of peoples to preserve or
maintain their ethnic, cultural or national identity (Walzer 1983, Miller 2008). In this view, the
sovereign state offers national groups a space in which they can shape together their common
destiny over time, largely free from the influence of outsiders. It is argued that people’s personal
projects, relationships, their very sense of self are shaped in large part by the cultural and
national community in which they are born and live. Indeed, many of the responsibilities and
attachments incurred through cultural membership are so integral to one’s individual personality
that to “divest ourselves or such commitments would be, in an important sense, to change our
identity” (Miller 1990).  By allowing distinct cultures to flourish, sovereign states in which
members control the admission of non-citizens thus protect an integral part of our selves.2
Another argument sees the collective right of border control as stemming from the entitlement of
groups to exercise their right of freedom of association. As Christopher Wellman argues, “just as
an individual has a right to determine whom (if anyone) he or she would like to marry, a group of
fellow-citizens has a right to determine whom (if anyone) it would like to invite into its political
community.” (Wellman, 2009) To demand that a state open its borders to outsiders is effectively
to force it members to associate with others, violating the key liberal principle that we should be
                                                 
2 More instrumental arguments, on the other hand, stress that liberal egalitarian principles and the institutions
associated with them (e.g., the welfare state) can only be realized in communities characterized by solidarity and
trust or certain shared understandings. These special relationships and understandings rely on border control because
they tend to emerge gradually over time, require a feeling that citizenship is of significance, and may be jeopardized
by large, short term changes in membership. See Gibney (2004).
8free to choose with whom we associate. Moreover, such forceful association goes against what it
is usually seen as legitimate to ask of states: few would think it right to compel Slovenia join the
EU or Canada join NAFTA. The decision on membership is such organizations is rightly seen as
lying within the prerogative of the individual state itself. In this view, the right to freedom of
association is not necessarily absolute. There are circumstances when the right of individuals to
associate freely might justifiably be curtailed. But there are powerful reasons why the right
should not be lightly disregarded. Entrance decisions can profoundly shape the character of states
by shaping the constitution of their membership with huge ramifications for current citizens.
The admission of new members can influence a state’s public culture, and impact upon questions
of public policy, the environment and demographic development.
Not all moral and political theorists find these arguments for border control convincing. Some,
like Joseph Carens, challenge the freedom of association argument with an individual right of
free movement. Carens argues that those who see the free movement as a key human liberty
within states should support the freedom of people to move between states because “every reason
why one might want to move within a state might also be a reason for moving between states.
One might want a job; one might fall in love with someone from another country; one might
belong to a religion that has few adherents in one’s native state and many in another” (1992, 27-
28).  Moreover, in the current global context, characterized by great inequalities between
countries, the case for free movement is even stronger. For membership in a state does a great
deal more than allocate living space; it largely determines the standard of living, public goods
and the amount of political security an individual will enjoy over the course of his or her
lifetime. By virtue of its powerful consequences, citizenship in the modern world is “a lot like
feudal status in the medieval world. It is assigned at birth; for the most part it is not subject to
change by an individuals will and efforts; and it has a major impact on that person’s life
chances” (Carens 1992, 26). Just as liberals first banded together to attack the restrictions and
inherited inequalities of feudalism, so liberals must now challenge “modern practices of
citizenship and state control over borders that tie people to the land of their birth almost as
effectively” (Carens 1992, 26-27)
9Developing the view that there is something morally arbitrary about state borders, Blake and
Risse have recently questioned the territorial appropriations of states (2009). Arguments that
stress the right of communities to preserve their culture or to exercise freedom of association
assume that states are simply membership organizations, groups of people analogous to clubs.
However, states don’t simply control membership, they also control territory, dividing up all of
the world’s inhabitable space exclusively between them. What gives states the right to territory
they current possess? (Gibney 2004).  Taking this question as their starting point, Blake and
Reiss (2009) explore the moral implications of the ancient view that that the earth is originally
held in common by mankind and thus the joint property of all the world’s denizens. The
assumption of common ownership, they argue, does not necessarily ground an international right
of free movement. But it does provide a reason why states in possession of underpopulated or
underutilized territory have a weaker claim to exclude migrants exercising their right of joint
ownership than states with overpopulated or overutilized territory (2009). There remains, of
course, the tricky issue of determining what constitutes under (or over) utilization of a particular
territory’s resources. Nonetheless, it’s apparent that if exclusion from entrance is to be justified,
the issue of the justice of the distribution of territory needs to be addressed.
Clearly, the nature and scope of the (moral) right of states to control the admission of non-
citizens to their territory is a controversial one. But the question of what obligations are owed to
those who have already arrived in the state is perhaps even thornier. While entrance controls
prevent individuals from realising their goals, those who have arrived already live under the
authority of the state, and this will shape their destiny in unique and profound ways. Deportation,
for example, typically deprives non-citizens of goods that they were already enjoying, including
proximity to family, friends, the use of property, and access to employment (Gibney 2009). In
section IV below, I will return to the normative debate over the moral responsibilities of states to
consider the issue of when resident non-citizens, like precarious residents, should have a right to
membership in the state in which they reside. But I will turn now to the question of what a
precarious resident is and why this status may have important consequences for human
development.
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III. Who is a precarious resident?
For my purposes, the term precarious resident describes non-citizens that share the following
four characteristics: 1. they hold fewer rights than citizens or permanent residents in the
countries in which the live; 2. they have a high level of vulnerability to deportation or expulsion;
3. they have no (or only extremely limited) opportunities for transferring to a more secure
immigration status (like citizenship or permanent residence); and 4. they are residing in the state
in question, rather than simply visiting or transiting through it.
These four characteristics pick out a diverse array of noncitizen groups not in terms of
circumstances that motivated departure (like “forced migrant” or “economic migrant”) but with
reference to the conditions in the country to which they have moved. Precarious residents are
typically highly vulnerable to exploitation (sexual, economic, and social) and abuse, and to
expulsion from the state. Even so, not all of those who meet the above criteria are typically
thought of as vulnerable. Foreign students (like those studying a medical schools in the US) are
seen by many as a kind of elite, yet their stay in the state in which they study is often subjected to
stringent limitations (e.g., they may not be able to work, they will have to leave at the end of
their studies, they may not be able to transfer status). To get a clearer picture of the nature of
precarious residence it is helpful, then, to draw upon some specific examples. In what follows I
will look at some non-citizens in the UK, Dominican Republic, the US, and the United Arab
Emirates.
Asylum seekers in the United Kingdom
Around 27,500 people from countries that included Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and Zimbabwe arrived
in Britain to claim asylum under 1951 Refugee Convention or other human rights instruments in
2007. They entered a hostile and suspicious political climate in which asylum seekers are
commonly viewed in the media and the general public as economic migrants exploiting the
country’s refugee system. Applicants for asylum are put through a process of status
determination that may take many months (on average around six), and over a year if appeals are
involved, to reach a decision. During this process, asylum seekers have “temporary admission”
to the UK, a status that “means that although their physical presence is recognised and not
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unlawful, they are legally considered not to have entered the country.” (Sawyer and Turpin
2005). This liminal status enables officials to expedite the removal of an applicant if his or her
claim is rejected.
Asylum seekers possess very limited rights. They face constraints on their place of residence,
freedom of movement, right to appeal decisions on movement, and access welfare benefits
associated with their status. They may be detained in centres equivalent to jails for the period
during which their claims are determined and pending their removal from the state. If they wish
to receive welfare benefits, they will have to live in parts of the country determined by state
authorities, often far from ethnic compatriots and sources of migrant support and assistance
(Schuster 2003). If they are not detained, asylum seekers are obliged to report regularly to
government centres in order to show they have not absconded. They are not allowed to undertake
paid work (Gibney 2009).
If their asylum or humanitarian claim fails (as it does for around 60 per cent of all applicants), an
asylum seeker has to leave the country. Welfare benefits cease twenty one days after an
unsuccessful decision, as does free access to the National Health System in all but emergency
situations. The government has recently trialed a system of placing into state care the dependent
children of parents made destitute by the withdrawal of welfare as way of encouraging failed
applicants to return home.  Such practices may be counterproductive. There is some evidence
that use of detention and more certain deportation simply encourages asylum seekers to
disappear into the community to live as an undocumented migrant. While most applicants face a
situation where they will either be granted or refused asylum, sometimes the British authorities
refuse to grant an applicant refugee status but refrain, for humanitarian reasons, from deporting
them. This has recently been the case with Zimbabweans, whom the government stopped
deporting in 2005.  In such cases, the individuals find themselves (temporarily) protected against
return but lacking any right to work or access welfare to support themselves (Webber 2008).
They are placed in an agonizing and ongoing limbo that prevents them from getting on with their
lives.
Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic
12
There is estimated to be between 500,000 and one million migrant workers from the
impoverished and conflict-wracked Caribbean country of Haiti in the Dominican Republic
(Amnesty International 2007). Workers from Haiti have been crossing to the porous border
between the countries since the 1920s, mostly to undertake seasonal work in the Dominican
Republic’s agricultural sector on sugar plantations. However, in the last decade, migrants have
increasingly found employment in other parts of the economy including construction, tourism,
and domestic work. Many of these worker migrants enter and remain in the country without
official permission.
Haitian migrant workers typically face appalling labour and residence conditions, partly due to
their lack of legal status, but also because of racist and discriminatory attitudes toward them at
both official and demotic level (Amnesty International 2007). For example, many of the batayes,
the settlements around the Dominican Republic in which many Haitians working in the
plantations have long resided, lack any formal medical services (Santiago 2008). Migrants who
labour in the shadow economy face a situation where worker rights, including the right to
organize a trade union and be paid for work done, are “virtually non-existent” (Amnesty
International 2007). Such exploitation, as well as generally low wages, exists partly because of
the extremely poor state of the Haitian economy and also because the threat of deportation
dampens collective activity in search of better conditions.
While state officials are largely absent in terms of protecting the rights of Haitian workers, they
have demonstrated a repeated willingness to enforce arbitrary and collective deportation of both
unlawful and lawfully resident Haitian migrants in response to public concerns about crime,
unlawful labour, and outbreaks of xenophobia. Intergenerational exclusion from citizenship and
the benefits of legal residence is ensured by the government’s practice of not registering births to
children of parents who do have a national registration card (cedula). The lack of a card has “a
direct effect on one’s education, ability to find employment, and access to social benefits -
particularly government programs aimed at improving access to healthcare” (Santiago 2008).
Indeed, the government and public attitude to the Haitians is summed up in the view that illegal
or unregistered Haitian non-citizens are “in transit” through the country rather than as residents.
This categorization, which stands in stark contradiction to the reality of the country’s reliance on
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a Haitian labour force and that fact that many Haitians have been residing for years or decades,
provides a Constitutional rationale for continuing to do little to protect the rights of Haitian
migrants and excluding them from citizenship (Amnesty International 2007).
Undocumented Mexicans in the United States
There are an estimated to be some 12 million undocumented migrants living in the US, of which
some 57 percent are from Mexico with the largest proportion of the rest from Latin America
(Escobar 2006).  These migrants have either overstayed their legitimate visas or have unlawfully
entered the US, often across the Mexican/US border. The largest numbers of undocumented
migrants are estimated to live in California, Texas, and Florida.  They have no legal right to work
in the US, but are hired by employers across a large swathe of the American economy, primarily
in agriculture, construction, manufacture, and the service industry, including restaurants and
cleaning.
The rights of undocumented migrants are very limited. Their illegal residence makes them
eligible for deportation upon apprehension by the authorities. If they have manufactured false
documents in order to gain work, they have committed a separate crime. They have no right to
access welfare provisions, unemployment benefits, or receive public housing. They may be held
in custody for long periods if it facilitates their deportation. Once deported, they face bars and
restrictions on their ability to return to the United States (Kanstroom 2007). Undocumented
migrants can access emergency health care and their children have a constitutional right to attend
public schools.  Moreover, children of illegal migrants born in the US are, by virtue of the US
constitution, citizens of the United States, a fact that prevents the creation of second generations
of unlawful migrants.
In recent years, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau in the Department of
Homeland Security has undertaken vigorous new efforts to locate and deport undocumented
migrants, adding to a new wave of insecurity amongst unlawfully present populations that has
forced many to limit interaction with the authorities even further (New York Times, May 1,
2007.) Between 1997 and 2007, the number aliens removed or returned from the United States
grew from 114,432 to 319,382. The difficulties associated with departure can have huge personal
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(as well as economic consequences). Many migrants unlawfully in US have spent many years
residing in the country and are part of families in which at least one member holds US
citizenship (Escobar 2006).
South Asian Worker Migrants in the United Arab Emirates
Some 95% of the workforce the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is made up of foreign migrants,
around 2.7 million workers in total. Most are from South Asia, including Pakistan, Sri Lanka,
Bangladesh and Nepal (Human Rights Watch 2006, 7). These migrants typically go into debt to
pay the worker agencies visa, travel and government costs and fees that enable them to take up
job contracts in unskilled sectors of the UAE economy, such as construction, domestic service
and agriculture. The conditions of work and residence of temporary contract labourers is of a
very low standard, leaving employers in the country open to charges of economic, physical and
(particularly in the case of female domestic workers) sexual exploitation.
National law in UAE requires regular breaks, maximum working hours, annual leave, severance
pay, overtime, and the right to leave one’s job if an employer does not fulfil his or her
contractural or legal obligations. However, these regulations are rarely enforced (Human Rights
Watch 2006, 11) The immigration status of the workers creates a huge power differential
between them and their employers that the state shows little interest in balancing. In the UAE,
collective action to improve pay and conditions by migrant workers is illegal, and likely to result
in detention and deportation. Deported individuals may still owe money to recruitment agents
lent to them so that they could take up their original contract. Migrant workers, moreover, cannot
change jobs, except with the permission of the previous employer. They can lawfully be paid
lower rates than UAE citizens, and often find themselves earning less than they were originally
promised (Human Rights Watch 2006). Migrant workers often live in spartan workers’
accommodation on the outskirts of major cities and face curfews and limits on the ability to
move freely around these cities. If they are domestic workers, they may live in the households
where they work, exposing them to a range of other vulnerabilities (like sexual abuse, long
working hours and underpayment) that are shielded from public view (Chammartin 2005).
Migrant workers are not permitted to bring family members with them to the UAE and the
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country offers them no avenues for the acquisition of citizenship, regardless of their length of
stay. The children of foreign citizens born in the UAE are not eligible for citizenship.
These four examples from different countries paint a picture of non-citizens made vulnerable by
their immigration status. A summary of their situation can be found in Table 1 below.
Table 1.
Protections and rights available to various types of residents
Citizens
(in Western
Countries)
Worker
Migrants
(UAE)
Undocumented
(Mexican)
Migrants (US)
Unregistered
(Haitian)
migrants in
the
Dominican
Republic
Asylum
Seekers in
the UK
Legality of
Residence
Very High Very High
(for
contracted
period)
Very Low
(Unlawfully
resident)
Very Low
(Unlawfully
resident)
High.
(Temporary
freedom
from
deportation.)
Social and
Civil Rights
High
(typically
full legal
rights to
welfare, to
work, to
move freely
about the
country)
Low
(generally
no access to
welfare;
limited
ability to
move about
the country;
Right to
work, but
no
automatic
right to
change
jobs)
Very Low. (No
rights to
welfare, to
work, to move
about freely;
may be
detained.)
Limited rights
to emergency
health care,
children have
access to public
schools)
Very Low.
(Few if any
state
protected
rights; lack
of state
provision for
health care
needs)
Low.
(Minimal
access to
welfare,
housing,
health care.)
No right to
work, may
be detained,
no right to
choose place
of residence
(if wishing
to receive
welfare
benefits.
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right to
change
jobs)
schools) (if wishing
to receive
welfare
benefits.
Vulnerability
to
Deportation
Low
(Protected
by
international
and
domestic
norms
against
citizen
expulsion
High
(freedom
from
deportation
depends on
continuation
of contract
and
appropriate
behaviour)
Very High Very High
(though
practical
possibility is
limited by
state capacity
and
economic
advantages of
continued
residence.)
High. (Will
be deported
if asylum
claim is
unsuccessful,
though
generally
will be
granted
residence if
determined
to be a
refugee.)
Opportunities
for moving to
citizenship or
permanent
residence
status
Not
applicable
Low.
(While
some
possibilities
of
extending
contract,
virtually no
possibility
of
citizenship)
Low.
(Dependent on
regularization,
though
offspring if
born in the US
will be
citizens.)
Low. Low
(unless
receive
refugee or
other
humanitarian
status.)
A number of observations about precarious residents can be drawn. First, precarious residents
can be found in Southern countries (the Dominican Republic) and Northern ones (the USA) and
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in liberal democratic states (the UK) and more authoritarian ones (UAE). Precarious residence is
generated less by the style or character of a particular kind of government (though elites
unconcerned with human rights may certainly exacerbate the level of exploitation, abuse, or
insecurity experienced by non-citizens) than by the ubiquitous tension between the state’s right
to determine who resides on its territory (the right to border control) and its responsibility to
provide protection to everyone residing in its sphere of its authority (the guarantee of human
rights).
Second, the precariousness of these non-citizens stems not simply from the limited rights they
have (though this certainly makes them vulnerable to a range of social, economic and political
hazards), but also from the fact that their continuing residence in the state is under threat. The
insecurity of residence deprives precarious residents of the kind of firm footing in society
necessary to lobby or militate for the protection of the rights that they have by law or to expand
their rights and opportunities. The interaction between deportation and a low level of rights is
clearly apparent in the cases of the UAE and the Dominican Republic where political
mobilisation is likely to be punished with expulsion. It is evident, too, in the United States, where
accessing putative rights (e.g., right to access the police) is likely to bring one to the attention of
the authorities increasing the prospect of deportation.
Third, precarious residents include people who have lived in the state in question for varying
periods of time. It is a category that may include the asylum seeker who have arrived in the UK
yesterday and the undocumented Mexican who may have lived in the US for decades. While, as
we shall see, distinct moral issues are raised by the existence of long term precarious residents,
the category includes newly arrived and long standing non-citizens.
Finally, in all the cases discussed, deep inequalities in the provision of economic opportunities
(or the provision of basic rights and security) play a key role in creating and perpetuating
precarious residence. Abject conditions are tolerated or even embraced by migrants because
circumstances in their own country are (or are perceived to be) worse. If seeking asylum in the
UK is a disempowering experience, returning to Iraq is a life-threatening one; if the working
conditions in the Dominican Republic are poor, the chances of finding work in Haiti may be
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impossible. These conditions provide one ground upon which we might distinguish precarious
residents from other forms of temporary migrants, like foreign students. In the case of the latter,
return to the country of origin is often a genuine option because, as desirable as staying in the
host country may be, conditions in state of origin are unlikely to result in economic deprivation
or the violation of basic rights.
Citizens as Precarious Residents?
The above examples deal with non-citizens made vulnerable by migration. But citizens can also
lose rights and protections by migrating within their own country in ways that are closely
analogous to precarious residents. Sometimes the loss of rights is fairly minor and temporary.
For example, under federal systems, like the US, it is not uncommon for certain privileges or
entitlements, such as discounted university education or access to local welfare benefits, to be
dependent on residence in a particular state or province for a certain period of time. However, in
other cases, the impact of movement on rights and entitlements may be more severe and long
lasting. The experience of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Azerbaijan powerfully
illustrates the point.
IDPs in Azerbyjan
The conflict over the disputed Ngorno-Karabakh region of the Caucasus has produced some
500,000 internally displaced persons scattered throughout Azerbaijan. These IDPs, prevented
from returning home because of the conflict, live in an array of temporary and semi-permanent
accommodation arrangements, often staying with relatives, or in public buildings schools,
kindergartens, and housing provided by international organisations. Forced movement has made
them second-class citizens, limiting their access to the rights citizens typically enjoy.
A key reason for their second class status stems from the residual effects of the so-called
propiska system. The propiska was a system of control over internal movement used in countries
making up the Soviet system. It required citizens to possess an internal passport that linked them
to a particular place of residence and made the provision of various social goods (e.g., housing,
and work permits) dependent upon staying in that place of residence (IDMC 2008). Under the
system, settling in a part of the Soviet Union different from that specified in one’s propiska was
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unlawful. The system was used in particular to prevent people from moving to the cities. While
Azerbyjan, like most former Soviet bloc countries, officially abandoned the propiska system
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, informal forms of residence controls live on, partly to
prevent people moving to the capital, Baku (IDMC 2008). These controls have important
implications for IDPs.
Many IDPs find their place of official residence and thus a range of benefits, entitlements and
privileges (permission to work, welfare benefits, etc.) tied to an area that was simply the first
place they arrived after fleeing conflict. While the area concerned may be far from employment
opportunities, social networks, or family members, attempts to change it may be very difficult. A
housing contract in the proposed new place of residence may be required, something next to
impossible to obtain without selling one’s previous house. Moreover, substantial bribes may
need to be paid to officials. In response, family bread winners often head to big cities in search of
work, resulting in divided families and precarious streams of income (IDMC 2008). Such close
linking of residence and key citizenship entitlements is common problem for IDPs generally.
Displacement can mean long term political disenfranchisement as the right to vote may be
exercisable only in the place where an individual was originally enrolled (IDMC 2007; Mooney
and Jarah 2005).
The case of IDPs shows that even citizens may find themselves in a situation similar to
precarious residence. To be sure, citizens typically cannot be deported and are thus spared a
defining feature of this group. Nonetheless, internal movement may disenfranchise citizens or
render them acutely vulnerable to a range of social and economic hazards. If migration does not
necessarily make citizens stateless, it may turn them into second class members.
IV. How many precarious residents are there?
There are tens of millions of people in the world today who fit the description I have provided of
a precarious resident. Getting to a more exact number is, however, extremely difficult.
“Precarious resident” is not an official category, but, as we’ve seen, is made up of people in a
range of different migrant groups, notably undocumented migrants, asylum seekers, and
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temporary migrants. Perhaps the tightest fit occurs between undocumented migrants because
their complete lack of lawful immigration status. Estimates of undocumented migration,
however, are notoriously unreliable because these migrants go to great length to hide their
presence and because state officials have no incentive to trumpet the degree to which they are
failing to control their borders.  That said, the Migration Policy Institute has estimated “the share
of unauthorized immigrants in the world's immigrant stock might put it at between 15 and 20
percent of the total”, a figure of “between 30 and 40 million immigrants” (Migration Policy
Institute 2005).  This is clearly a conservative estimate because another by a reliable body has
put the number of “irregular migrants” (those without formal status) at 20 million in India alone
(GCIM 2005, 85).
The volume of “temporary migrants”, a group that one would expect to include a substantial
number of precarious residents, is not much easier to discern.  OECD countries recorded the
number of migrants who remain in their countries for less than a year, a group divided between
working holiday makers, seasonal workers and other types of worker migrants, at around 2.5
million entered (about three times the number of permanent migrants entering) in 2006 (OECD
2008, 134-135). By contrast, most non-OECD countries keep few reliable records as to
temporary migration numbers.
Arguably the soundest figures available relate to asylum seekers, who tend to make officially
registered claims. According to UNHCR figures, some 647,000 asylum claims were made either
to governments or directly to UNHCR worldwide in 2007. This number, like the volume of
recognized refugees, is lower than that which pertained in the early 2000s. In 2003, for example,
some 855,000 applications for asylum were received.  Some have attributed these falling
numbers to the success of restrictive entrance policies rather than a decrease in people needing
protection (UNHCR 2008). Certainly, statistics show that the number of internally displaced
people has increased rapidly in recent years to 26 million in 2007, though this may have to do
with better reporting (UNHCR 2008).
A partial insight into the trajectory of the numbers of precarious resident numbers is gained by
looking at the specific groups considered above. In the UK, the number of asylum seekers has
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fallen quite dramatically since the early 2000s from a peak of 84,130 in 2002 to 23,430 in 2007.
A combination of factors seem to have contributed to the drop including the government’s
extensive use of non-arrival policies, a worldwide fall in refugee applications, and more people
to seeking a kind of informal asylum in the UK by becoming illegal immigrants rather than
declared asylum seekers. In the US, the rate of increase (though not the total number) of illegal
immigrants seems to be falling, partly as a result of the international global downturn and partly
due to more vigorous enforcement practices. According to Pew Research (2008), in March 2008,
11.9 million undocumented workers were living in the US; in 2005, it was 11.1 million, and in
2000, 8.4 million. In the UAE, the rate of migrant workers in the construction industry boomed
throughout much of the 2000s, rising to some 1.2 million, according to government figures, on
the back of a huge building boom. Recent reports, however, are that the boom is now over and
jobs are falling away at a rapid rate. One cited estimate is that around 1500 work permits and
visas are being cancelled daily in Dubai (Zawya 2009). The situation in the Dominican Republic
is more difficult to ascertain. This is partly because baseline estimates as to the Haitian migrant
worker population are unreliable, varying between 500,000 and 1 million. That said, while there
is some evidence that increased seriousness in the use of deportation by the government of the
Republic has made a small dent in the number of Haitians, the overall trend over the last decade
has been towards growing numbers of new settlers.
In sum, all available figures suggest that huge (though ultimately indeterminate) numbers of
people worldwide live in a situation of precarious residence. While the pressures of government
policy and global economic recession may diminish these numbers by pushing people back
home, this is in no way guaranteed. Restrictive entrance and deportation policies may encourage
asylum seekers to avoid contact with the state by living illegally in the countries they enter. The
non-renewal of employment contracts for temporary workers due to recession may equally turn
legal migrants into unlawful ones, thus boosting the ranks of precarious residents.
V. The novelty and uses of precarious residence
Precarious residence is not a new phenomenon. Political communities, dating back at least as far
as the ancient Greeks, have often put stringent conditions on the residence of foreigners,
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exploiting their labour while freezing them out of membership. More recently, the guestworker
(or gastarbeiter) policies of European countries during the 1950s and 1960s operated on broadly
similar principles. But precarious residence as a contemporary matter is closely linked to
economic globalization and, paradoxically, thae development of the international human rights
regime.
Particularly since the end of the Cold War, economic globalization (and the revolution in
transportation and communications) have freed up the movement of capital, goods and services
globally without lifting of restrictions on the movement of labour. This contradiction has been
reduced in practice by the movement of undocumented migrants between countries facilitated by
trafficking and smuggling networks.  Undocumented workers, emanating primarily from Africa,
Asia and South America, have served as an informal and unacknowledged labour source of many
countries both in the South and North. Indeed, most observers agree that illegal migration has
grown faster than any other type of international migration in recent years (Migration Policy
Institute, 2005), both through the design and incapacities of states, creating a steady stream of
new precarious residents.
Globalizing forces have also played a role in facilitating legal temporary migration that results in
precarious residence. From the perspective of sending states, citizens working overseas can remit
billions of dollars to the national economy. The Philippines, for example, had more the 7.7
million of its citizens living overseas in 2003, earning an estimated US$8.5 billion in remittances
(GCIM 2005). This kind of contribution gives states a strong interest in ensuring that labour
continues to be accepted by labour importing countries, even if it is under conditions of
precarious residence. From the perspective of receiving states, developments in transportation
and communication that enable speedy intercontinental travel makes states looking for labour no
longer dependent on the conditions and pay acceptable to workers in their immediate
geographical region. States can scour the globe looking for workers who may, because of the
desperate conditions they face in their own country, be prepared to accept conditions that most
would consider substandard.
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Another, very different, factor contributing to the existence precarious residence was evident in
the case of the UK’s treatment of asylum seekers discussed above. Human rights law in the post-
1945 world has placed strong constraints on states returning refugees and other categories of
migrants to countries where they might be persecuted or face human rights violations.  But the
expansion of these protections has not always been accompanied by clarity in the social, civil
and political rights (beyond temporary freedom from deportation) that those whose claims for
protection are being adjudged or are granted forms of (non-Refugee Convention) humanitarian
status should have (McAdam 2007). In the absence of clarity, many governments withhold rights
from these (temporarily) non-deportable groups in order to deter others from coming or to enable
the speedy removal of people who have protection once things improve in their home country,
creating precarious residents.
While large scale social and economic forces contribute its existence, state practices at the
individual level in terms of integration, rights protection, and expulsion also shape precarious
residence.  Notwithstanding its negative consequences, precarious residence persists in large
measure because states find it useful. What purposes does it serve? It can have economic benefits
to the host state, or it may assist states in achieving their broader migration control objectives by
either deterring illegal migration or facilitating the departure of unwanted migrants.
Economic Benefits
Individuals with few rights can serve as an easily exploitable labour force for countries with
worker shortages in various areas but do not wish to encourage immigration for permanent
settlement. Foreign workers may be cheaper (because they can be hired informally without costs
associated with pensions, sickness benefits, etc.); more disciplined and responsive to economic
downturns (because they can be deported if not needed, or threatened with deportation); and
more receptive to doing dirty, dangerous, or humiliating forms of work (because they are likely
to come from countries where opportunities for gainful employment are virtually nonexistent).
In some countries, the nature of the economic exploitation of precarious residents is explicit and
lawful. In the UAE restrictions, open worker migration programmes exist and are accompanied
by laws restricting the ability of migrants to change jobs, allow lower rates of pay, etc. In other
countries, the economic use of precarious residence can be inferred from state behaviour. The
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mass and brutal deportation of Indonesian foreign workers from Malaysia in 1998, fittingly code-
named “Operation Go-Away”, began after the Asian economic crisis had reduced the country’s
labour demand. Forms of highly vulnerable, and in some cases illegal, labour were tolerated only
whilst the economy needed labour. Sometimes, however, state responses are more subtle.  While
US governments have long expressed hostility to the presence undocumented migrants, the
enforcement of laws tends to tell another story. There is evidence that the degree of immigration
enforcement varies amongst different sectors of the economy depending on the need for labour
and the sensitivity of the sector labour prices. According to one researcher, “increases in the
relative production price for an immigration intensive industry is associated with a decrease in
border enforcement six to ten months into the future.” (Hanson.) Precarious residents may be
unwanted but also economically necessary.
Deterrence
Precarious residence may serve border control objectives by demonstrating to potential entrants
that life will be very unpleasant for them. While the deterrent value of precarious residence is
probably impossible to measure, there is little doubt that state officials see restrictions on the
rights of certain categories of unwanted or illegal migrants as influencing migration decisions. In
the UK, for example, policies towards asylum seekers became increasingly tough in the early
2000s in response to rising numbers of applications (Gibney 2004). The government expanded
the use of detention, reduced access to welfare benefits, tightly controlled the residence of
asylum applicants and steadfastly refused to grant asylum seekers the right to work largely
because it believes such actions deter those with weak refugee claims. According the then Home
Secretary, David Blunkett, “We are an open, trading nation, and we will continue to meet our
obligatons…to provide a safe haven… But we will not be seen as a safe touch… we are
tightening our rules and deploying every possible measure to deter and detect [illegal
immigrants]” (quoted in Malloch & Stanley, 2005). The goal of deterrence is also a perennial
feature of debates over the introduction of amnesties for illegal migrants that would legalise their
status. A San Francisco Chronicle columnist captures the core of the concern: “No matter what
Bush and Senate members wanted to call it, they were pushing for amnesty last year. And the
biggest problem with amnesty is the magnet effect… A law that puts … [illegal immigrants] on a
path to citizenship would send a message to would-be immigrants across the globe that they can
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sneak into this country, break our laws and be rewarded.” (Saunders 2007) The value of the
deprivation of rights, then, is that it may repel unwanted entrants.
Return
A third reason for the continued existence of precarious residence is the belief that it encourage
unwanted migrants to return home. Just as precarious residence may be used to deter arrivals, so
too it makes returning home for those already in the state a more desirable option. By making life
so uncomfortable as to encourage return, are spared the practical, logistical and moral difficulties
associated with deportation. There are many reasons why a state may want certain groups off its
territory: it may want to assert the integrity of its borders, to preserve an exclusive national
identity, or possess hostility towards various foreign groups. Precarious residence militates
against integration into the host country by depriving migrants of right to work or, through
detention, connection to the broader community (Gibney 2008). The UAE’s policies are
explicitly designed to prevent integration because migrant workers cannot bring their families
with them, are spatially segregated from the domestic population, and avenues for citizenship are
blocked off by citizenship policies based on descent (jus sanguinis). Britain’s policies towards
asylum seekers, which make destitution a real possibility, have been described by one NGO as
an attempt by “the government …to starve people out of the country” (The Guardian 2009). In
addition, to using collective deportation practices from time to time, the Dominican Republic’s
approach has been actively set about preventing proper legal integration of Haitian and other
worker migrants by defining them unlawful residents “as people ‘in transit’ and imposing
limitations on their ability on their right to Dominican nationality” (Amnesty International 2007).
Many measures that restrict migrant rights are aimed at ensuring that the state becomes like a
cheap hotel, bearable perhaps for a short amount of time but not the kind of place one would
want to stay for long.
VI. Human Development Consequences
What are the consequences of precarious residence for human development? The situation of
precarious residents shows clearly that immigration status plays an important role in determining
an individual or group’s vulnerability to a range of social, economic and political hazards. While
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all residents of a state (legal and illegal) may possess a range of rights in name (if only human
rights), their ability to exercise or to be protected by these rights is shaped by their status, and in
particular, by their right to remain legally present in the state.
I want highlight now some of the most important vulnerabilities associated with precarious
residence by drawing upon the examples of the cases discussed above. Necessarily, I will paint
only a very partial picture. Precarious residents, as we have seen, are a very diverse group,
occupying different points along a hierarchy of rights-bearers, and the costs they bear are often
hidden from view. As I shall suggest later, expanding the capabilities and entitlements of
precarious residents poses special challenges in an international context where states claim wide-
ranging powers to control migration.
Economic exploitation
Most migrants move between countries in the search for jobs or levels of income unattainable at
home. As we have seen, however, the tools used by states to prevent integration (the threat of
deportation, limited social, economic and political rights, etc.) can make migrants vulnerable to
exploitation, particularly at the hands of employers, turning foreign residence into an
economically detrimental experience. This is clear in the case of guest worker migrants in the
UAE. Numerous reports by independent bodies on the conditions of these migrants illustrate that
non-payment or underpayment of wages is common practice. Some 20,000 migrants filed
complaints about the nonpayment of wages and conditions of employment in 2005 alone,
according to the UAE’s own (far from complete) records (Human Rights Watch 2006, 54).
Efforts by workers, both individually and collectively, to challenge the denial of what is
rightfully theirs is hampered by weak enforcement of employment practices, restrictions on
collective bargaining, and the powers of employers to make workers eligible for deportation or
arrest. This presents workers with a tragic dilemma. They can continue working under
exploitative conditions or they can initiate actions (strikes, complaints to employers, or a return
home) that may result in the violation of their contract. If they take the latter course and lose
their job, they are likely to return home worse off financially than when they started because they
now owe money to the agencies that financed their original trip.
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The situation faced by unlawful migrants is typically worse. A common complaint revealed in
studies of this group is non-payment by unscrupulous employers (Gibney 2000). Workers are
unlikely to have any authorities whatsoever to which to appeal without exposing themselves to
deportation. Furthermore, there is a close correlation between illegal work and non-payment of
wages and poor working conditions. Employers who are willing to hire illegal labour
(particularly in large numbers) are unlikely to be concerned about the niceties of labour laws or
workers rights more generally. Hence, migrant workers are usually employed under the worst
conditions of any employees, as in sweatshops, or in areas of the economy that demand
dangerous, poorly remunerated, and taxing labour. Migration status (or lack of it) thus shapes not
only the question of whether one will be paid but also the kinds of employment one will
undertake and the conditions therein.
Sexual Exploitation
While precarious residence may have negative economic impacts, it may also be a risk to one’s
bodily integrity. The power differentials created by a liminal status commonly lead to sexual
exploitation. Women are particularly vulnerable in this regard, in part because they tend to be
employed in domestic realm (as household help or childcare) and thus are isolated from sources
of assistance or protection.  The link between sexual exploitation and immigration status was
highlighted in a recent International Labor Organization study in which interviews were
conducted with domestic migrant workers in the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Lebanon
(Chammartin 2005). As well as experiencing, like their male counterparts in more public sectors
of the economy, wages arbitrarily withheld or not paid, substantial numbers of female workers
(over 50 percent in Kuwait) interviewed complained of “physical (including sexual),
psychological and verbal abuse”, with most workers mentioning vulnerability to sexual abuse at
the hands of their employer or employers friends or relatives as an issue (Chammartin 2005). The
long term consequences of such exploitation are difficult to measure, but they are real and
negative.
Similar kinds of sexual exploitation and withholding of wages has been reported in many studies
of undocumented migrant populations across the globe with experiences cited that range from
individual cases of abuse to more systematic examples organized trafficking into prostitution. In
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the Dominican Republic, for example, Haitian migrants often take up opportunities for work in
the sex trade because they offer one of the few jobs open to those barred from the formal
economy (Santiago 2008). The economic and sexual exploitation of migrants are diverse
phenomena with a range of different causes and manifestations but they can often be traced back
to poverty or vulnerability created by immigration status.
Poor Health
The health of migrant has a profound effect on their ability to provide for themselves and their
families as well as the overall quality of life of the sick individual and unpaid carers. Health
problems can interrupt employment and wage earnings and add health care costs to the regular
expenses of people with few financial resources. Precarious residence has important health
consequences both for the individual migrants and for the broader society.
In most Western countries, everyone—including undocumented migrants—has the right to
emergency health care regardless of immigration status. For example, even the U.S’s Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 which curtailed the rights of
undocumented (and other) migrants to access state welfare benefits and provisions, excluded
health care items and services “necessary for the treatment of emergency medical conditions”
(Kullgren 2003).  Nonetheless, the access of undocumented migrants to health care tends to be
lower than that of other US residents. Health care is expensive and for most individuals is paid
for through employment related insurance schemes. As undocumented migrants work in informal
and largely unregulated sectors of the economy, they will not be able to access insurance.
However, even their access to emergency medical treatment is poor.  A recent US study found
that undocumented migrants with tuberculosis “have symptoms longer before seeking care than
documented migrants…, resulting in more severe symptoms and more opportunities for
transmission” (Infectious Diseases Society of America, 2008). While turberculosis has been
declining in recent years amongst citizens, rates amongst immigrant populations in the US are
still substantial. This has given rise to concerns that tuberculosis may reemerge as a health issue
across US society. Low levels of access to emergency treatment can be attributed to a number of
factors, including ignorance of eligibility for health care but concerns about expulsion plays a
large role as well. Recently, legislation that would have made it mandatory for hospitals to report
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the immigration status of those seeking health care was debated in the US Congress
(Immigration National Law Centre 2004). While the legislation was ultimately defeated, the link
between health care and immigration control was firmly established.
Precarious residence is also linked to poor health because migrants in this situation are more
likely to work in areas of the economy where injuries and illnesses are common, such as
construction and the sex trade. In the Dominican Republic, the role of young women in sex
industry has led to extremely high rates of HIV and sexually transmitted diseases within the
Haitian community generally, as diseases gained at work are passed on. The situation is
worsened further by the government’s failure to deliver health services in the batayes in which
many of the affected Haitians live (Santiago 2008). In this case, it is evident that poor health and
lower life expectancy is part of a cycle engendered by marginalization and lack of recognition of
the reality of residence.
Difficulties with integration and return
The human development of migrants is heavily shaped by their ability to integrate successfully
(find employment, establish social connections, acquire the language, etc.) into their new
societies or reintegrate back into their country of origin upon return. Precarious residence may
profoundly affect integration or reintegration. It is helpful here to consider the situation of
asylum seekers in the UK. They typically find themselves waiting for a period of six months to a
year for their asylum claim to be processed during which their lives are on hold. They may not
work, they may be held in detention, they have no right to be unified with any family outside the
country, where they live and how much money they will have will be determined by the state. If
they are allowed to attend an educational course, they do so in the knowledge that they may
never complete it because deportation is an option at any time; they are likely to be close to
destitute (The Guardian 2009).
What are the consequences of this period of state-organised limbo? It may provide the individual
with a powerful incentive to seek informal asylum by disappearing into the community to
become an undocumented migrant. One experience of precarious residence is thus swapped for
another (Gibney 2008). For those that remain in the asylum system, however, the long term
implications may be very negative. A recent report of asylum seekers in two English boroughs
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suggested that asylum seekers who go on to attain refugee status find it difficult to integrate
because of their experience as asylum seeker has weakened their ability to establish the kinds of
social connections crucial to establishing themselves as a member of society (Refugee Council &
University of Birmingham 2007). The study found that lack of right to work, and lack of access
to social and economic resources inhibited both the willingness and the ability of asylum seekers
to establish the kinds of personal and social connections necessary for successful incorporation
into society (Refugee Council & University of Birmingham 2007).  The consequences for
asylum seekers who are detained are even more likely to be negative (Keller et al. 2003). A
wealth of research evidence shows that they can face psychological problems (especially if their
period of detention was for a substantial period) that reverberate long after detention is over.
The period of limbo also has consequences for precarious residents who return (or are returned)
to their country of origin. Long periods without any right to work may prevent migrants from
accumulating the financial and psychological resources to be able to start afresh. Skills may have
atrophied and huge debts may still be owed from the passage in search of asylum. For example,
until recently, the Australian government charged immigration detainees for days spent in
detention, leading many deported migrants to return home with significant debts (Danby 2008).
In one of the few studies to track asylum seekers back to their countries of origin, the Australian
scholar David Corlett interviewed twenty eight asylum seekers who had been held in
immigration detention in Australia and removed to Iran, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. According to
Corlett, for almost all of the returnees “the implications of Australia's detention policies
continued to affect …[them once] they had been returned. People spoke of ongoing sleep
difficulties, continuing nightmares, headaches that were persistent. They spoke of…losing their
dignity, of having lost their humanity, and they also spoke of being institutionalised in
Australia's detention regime.” (Corlett 2005). A key implication of Corlett’s study is that
Australia’s detention policies undermined people’s long term ability to make decisions (Corlett
2005) with far reaching consequences for those concerned.
I have presented here only a sample of the consequences that may flow from precarious
residence in terms of economic and sexual exploitation, health, and social integration and
reintegration. It’s clear that the negative implications for human development fall not just on
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precarious residents themselves but, in many cases, on their families and on the broader
communities of which they are a part. When precarious residents don’t receive treatment for
infectious diseases, society as a whole may suffer; when precarious residents find it difficult to
integrate because of their experiences, society is worse off. There are, then, powerful self-
interested reasons why states have an interest in addressing the plight of precarious residents. As
I now want to show, however, there are also important moral reasons for incorporating
precarious residents into the community of rights-holders.
VII. Human Rights or Membership Rights?
How should we conceptualise the moral claims of precarious residents? It is clear that they owed
all rights that accrue to individuals as humans, that is, independent of their immigration or
citizenship status. Everyone, regardless of their background or official status, should have the
right not to exploited, assaulted, tortured or held in custody without reason. They should have the
right to access emergency health care treatment, police and emergency services, and the courts.
They should have a safe working environment and be paid for work undertaken and have the
right to bargain and even strike for fair working conditions. Such rights may be basic but, as we
have seen, they are in no way trivial to the day to day lives of precarious non-citizens who are
often particularly vulnerable to exploitation and abuse. They represent a kind of moral minimum
that is owed to anyone in the territory of the state, including the tourist passing through on
holiday or the passenger in transit.
We have seen that for undocumented migrants, in particular, even these most basic rights may be
hollow. Ruth Rubio-Marin has written  that the “absolutely precarious residential and working
status” of undocumented migrants “places them in a vulnerable and exploitable position from
which even the enjoyment of these rights and guarantees theoretically granted to them is often
practically impossible” (2000, 81). Many precarious residents face what might be called a “rights
trap”: in order to claim rights and state protections, unlawful migrants must bring themselves to
the attention of state authorities (they must, for example, call upon the police or judicial
authorities). In this case fundamental human rights are neutered not directly by government
inaction or inability but as an indirect result of migration control practices. The state’s right to
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deport undermines the conditions necessary for the realization of human rights for all those on its
territory.
I shall say more about how states might guarantee human rights while retaining deportation
powers below. But before doing so it is important to ask, do human rights capture the limits of
what states owe precarious residents? An obvious virtue of the human rights approach is that it
offers exactly the same answer to the question of what is owed to each and every non-citizen in
the state. But this is also one of its major deficiencies. Human rights pick out only what is owed
to all who enter the state from the permanent resident to the tourist. This lack of discrimination
does not do justice to the deep reliance that some non-citizens on state protection and assistance
by virtue of their residence. It ignores the fact that a key problem raised by precarious residents
is that, morally, they often have a deep stake in the societies in which they live. One needs to
consider not just what is owed to precarious residents by virtue of their humanity, but also the
rights they have as members of the states in which they have come to reside.
Of course, states rarely consider precarious residents as members. As I have shown, precarious
residence exists largely because states want to prevent the merging of some non-citizens into
membership. In their attempts to exclude non-citizens, international and domestic law is often on
the side of the state. Despite much national variation, where one will receive citizenship in the
contemporary world is determined almost entirely by three principles: the principle of jus soli,
whereby individuals born on the territory of the state are entitled to citizenship in the state; the
principle of jus sanguinis, whereby individuals gain citizenship by being born to a citizen, i.e.,
through descent; and, through the process of naturalisation, whereby state officials define,
through some political process, the requirements of foreigners being admitted to citizenship.
There has been some disquiet over these principles in recent scholarship. A key concern is that
they make the distribution of citizenship dependent upon caprice or the luck of birth. Citizenship
has thus been described as “arbitrary” (Schacar 2002, 8), a quasi “feudal status” (Carens 1992,
26), or as resting upon “historical contingencies” (Benhabib 2004).  Without challenging
birthright citizenship as one basis for membership in the modern state, some scholars have
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argued that this principle needs to be supplemented by others which offer pathways to
membership for non-citizens residing in the state.
Precarious residents as subjects
One way of conceptualising precarious residents involves emphasizing their situation as subjects
of state power; as people who live under the laws of a particular state. According to Michael
Walzer, “men and women are either subject to the state’s authority, or they are not, and if they
are subject, they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what that authority does”
(1983, 61). The key idea in the approach is that any state that rules (i.e., exercises coercive force)
over a group of people is legitimate only if they consent to such rule.
This position is common to a range of different liberal and democratic theories of politics.
Classical liberal theorists, like John Locke, used hypothetical consent theories to legitimate the
coercive power of the state. Contemporary liberals, like Michael Blake (2006) and Stephen
Macedo (2008), use the coercion argument as a way of justifying exclusive practices towards
foreigners, particularly as an argument against open borders. Michael Blake, for example, has
recently argued that liberals “value internal mobility and voting rights as part of the package of
justifications for political coercion. We have no equivalent reason to extend these rights to
individuals who are not part of the political community in question, but who merely seek to
become so subject” (2006).  But while these authors use the argument from subjection to justify
preventing foreigners from entering the state, the principle has more inclusive implications for
non-citizens who have already arrived. For everyone living in the state is subject to the state’s
coercive power, including precarious residents. Indeed, it could be argued that precarious
residents are subject to state authority in uniquely powerful ways. As Walzer suggests, these
non-citizens “experience the state as a pervasive and frightening power that shapes their lives
and regulates their every move—and never asks for their opinion.”(Walzer 1983, 59). Since the
state’s power is territorial in nature, the argument from coercion grounds special rights not
simply for members but for everyone residing (and perhaps even present) in the state.
Democratic theorists have offered a slightly different perspective on the moral issues arising
from subjection by emphasising the issue of tyranny. The presence of large numbers of people,
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like precarious residents, living in a democratic state but lacking rights of political participation
jeopardises not just the rights of non-citizens, but also the overall health of democratic society.
“We ought not to subjugate immigrants”, the legal theorist Owen Fiss has written, “not because
we owe them anything but to preserve our society as a community of equals” (quoted in Bosniak
2006, 128).
The democratic objection to individuals living in the state but outside the demos has been subtly
explored by Michael Walzer (1983). Walzer has argued that it was unjust for European states to
take in immigrants on short term contracts while forbidding them access to citizenship to
encourage their eventual return home, like the Turks recruited for work in Germany during the
1950s and 1960s. The so-called “guestworker system”, which was closely analogous to the
UAE’s current guestworker programme, involved migrants to living in the state not only as
“guests but also [as] subjects” and ruled by a “band of citizen-tyrants” (Walzer 1983, 58).
Moreover, even the fact that the immigrants concerned consented to the terms of their residence
did not make the state’s restriction of their rights legitimate. Walzer argues that simple consent
“given at a single moment in time, while it is sufficient to legitimise market transactions, is not
sufficient for democratic politics.”
Political power is precisely the ability to make decisions over periods of time, to change the
rules, to cope with emergencies; it can’t be exercised democratically without the ongoing consent
of its subjects. And its subjects include every man and woman who lives within the territory over
which those decisions are enforced. (1983, 58)
Taking democratic principles seriously means that “[p]olitical justice is a bar to permanent
alienage—either for particular individuals or for a class of changing individuals.” (Walzer 1983,
61)
Similar conclusions to Walzer’s can be found in the work of other political theorists who valorise
democracy. Writing on immigrant integration, the philosopher David Miller has suggested that
“on democratic grounds it appears anomalous for someone whose interests are chiefly impacted
by the policies of a particular state to have no say in determining those policies.” (2008)
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“Whatever the formal terms of admission”, Miller says, modern states must ultimately offer
citizenship to all individuals who “build their lives in the new country.” (Miller 2007, italics
added)
Precarious residents as societal members
A different way of reconceptualising membership is through the principle of societal
membership (Bauböck 1997). In this view, the membership of a state should be composed of
everyone who has a significant stake in the development and direction of the society in question,
a category that typically extends beyond citizens. While the principle of subjection concentrated
on the injustice of not recognising individuals as political agents, the societal membership
principle tends to attach weight to men and women as social and economic agents even
regardless of formal status (Lane 2006, 132). For the societal membership principle, the test of
membership is the depth of one’s roots into a particular society, and the personal, social and
economic costs of depriving them of that society.
The societal membership principle is compatible with a range of different political approaches.
More nationalist accounts can see in the principle a way of defining what membership
means—as social and economic belonging—that is not reducible simply to liberal rights. Joseph
Carens, the liberal egalitarian, has also appealed to the principle in non-ideal mode. He argues
that it is unjust for a state to deport any legal or illegal resident who has lived in the state for five
years or more (2005). The time period he suggests simply acts as a proxy for the kinds of
emotional and personal connections and social and economic roots that individuals can be
expected to have established in a society over time.
Perhaps the most developed account of societal membership is offered by Rainer Bauböck with
his stakeholder principle. Bauböck’s approach aims to fuse together an inclusive account of
membership in the state consistent with liberal approaches with a view of the value of citizenship
as a key human good distinctive of republican political thought (2005, 686). The result of this
fusion is an approach to membership that sees the subjecthood (or “affected interest”) principle
as, on its own, problematic grounds for access to membership. One reason for this is that, if
consistently applied, it would seem to require that at the same time as a non-citizen gains
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membership in their state of residence, they should lose citizenship in their country of origin
because they are no longer subject to its laws or affected by its democratic decisions (2005, 686).
This result would, however, be inattentive to the deep connections that individuals may still
possess to their country of origin.
In the place of subjecthood, Bauböck proposes that non-citizens should be offered membership
on the grounds that they have “an interest in membership that makes the individual’s
fundamental rights dependent upon protection by a particular polity; and that ties an individual’s
well-being to the common good of that polity.”(2005, 686) According to the principle,
citizenship, including voting rights, would be liberal and inclusive enough to accommodate the
reality of societal membership as well the right to hold multiple memberships simultaneously (in
some cases). However, it would not be so inclusive as to rule out some requirements (e.g., a
length period of residence to demonstrate a stake in society) for the gaining on citizenship (2005,
686).
The principle of societal membership, expressed in various ways, provides a powerful account of
why it is wrong to exclude long term resident non-citizens, including precarious residents, from
access to citizenship. Moreover, it is a principle that implicitly forms of a part of most practical
calls to regularize unlawfully resident immigrants or long term asylum seekers: most amnesty
programmes are informed by the idea that the state has a special responsibility to migrants that
have been in the state for an extend period (be it five, eight or ten years). The principle demands
an alignment between the reality of people’s social existence—their level of effective integration
or reliance on a particular society—and their legal status.
Neither the principle of subjection nor the principle of societal membership as outlined here tells
us exactly the full panoply of rights that are owed to non-citizens and at what exact point a state
incurs responsibilities to precarious residents similar to those it has to its citizens. Tellingly,
however, both of these principles conclude that, over time, non-citizens become deeply reliant on
the state in which they live and which governs their lives and that this reliance demands a
different and more extensive set of rights to shape the power of the state (and to be protected
from it) than are owed to foreigners in general. To treat certain migrants on state territory
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permanently as guests or as trespassers rather than as members (or members in the making) is
morally dubious, not least for democratic states.
Table 2.
Principles of Inclusion into Membership and their Consequences for Precarious Residents
Basis of Inclusion Implications for
Precarious
Residents
Popularity of use
Jus Sanguinis Descent (typically
citizenship is passed
on through parent,
though the process
may be
generationally
limited by
combining it with
jus soli.
Exclusionary Virtually universal
(though
supplemented in
most countries by
jus soli, procedures
for naturalisation.
Some countries
more reliant on it
than others, e.g.
UAE )
Jus Soli Birth on national
territory. Different
countries have
different rules on
whether or not
children have to be
born of parents
legally present in
the country.
Inclusionary
(particularly if, like
the US and unlike
the UK, right to
citizenship is not
dependent on legal
residence).
Very widespread,
though varying in
importance (relative
to jus sanguinis)
across different
states.
Subjection All those
(territorially
present) and subject
to the state’s
authority and laws
should have a right
to membership.
Highly inclusionary
(though as usually
presented lacks
specificity on what
kind of membership
those who are
subject to state
authority should
Extremely rare
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to the state’s
authority and laws
should have a right
to membership.
specificity on what
kind of membership
those who are
subject to state
authority should
have and how long
one needs to be
present.)
Stakeholder Everyone who has a
significant stake in
the development
and direction of the
state.
Inclusionary.
(Would seem to
provide a strong
basis for including
long-term
precarious residents
into citizenship
regardless of legal
standing.)
Rare (though
regularisation
campaigns based
implicitly on
stakeholder type
principles have
occurred in many
states at different
times targeted at
general illegal
resident populations
or specific groups.)
Reducing Precariousness
It is clear that the problem of precarious residence admits of no single solution simply because
precarious residence has a range of different manifestations and correspondingly a range of
different causes. There is no magic bullet in a world where states claim wide-ranging rights to
control the access of non-citizens to their territory. Nonetheless, there are a range of steps that
states can take that may positively impact upon the lives of precarious residents. I will conclude
by drawing upon the discussion above to outline three specific reforms.
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The first is the erection of firewalls between the provision of emergency services to migrants and
immigration authorities. One recurring problem for unlawful migrants is that in accessing basic
state provide services (emergency health treatment, police protection, etc.) they risk advertising
their illegal residence in the state. In response, Joseph Carens has suggested that if states and
their citizens are serious about everyone’s access to basic rights, they should build a “firewall”
between the authorities that act to guarantee these rights (or provide these services) and those
whose job it is to enforce immigration laws (Carens 2005). A key aspect of any firewall
approach is that its existence should widely publicized to those who would benefit from its use.
Unless precarious residents can feel confident that such firewalls exist, it is unlikely to rectify the
problem it was designed to solve.
To undertake this reform would in many respects be to tread the opposite direction to that being
pursued in some Western states, where non-immigration authorities are being recruited in the
fight against illegal migration. But unless such firewalls exist, even the most basic of human
rights (such as the right not be physically and sexually assaulted) may simply be empty or out of
reach for certain categories of migrants. It has been evident in this paper, moreover, that there are
also strong pragmatic reasons, stemming from the interest in reducing the spread of
communicable diseases and apprehending dangerous criminals, why it is important for migrants
to be able to approach doctors and police authorities.
A second reform is the provision of help and resources to assist those migrants wishing to return
to their countries of origin with some dignity.  The only way of truly judging whether precarious
residence is a choice is by offering migrants genuine options for returning home that enable
successful reintegration back into the country of origin. Here, there is something to be learnt
from programmes for the return of refugees at the end of wars in the Former Yugoslavia. Many
of these programmes provided start up funds to returning refugees, “look and see” or preparatory
visits, and a more general involvement in the process of return (Black and Koser, 1999). In
recent years, the UK government has offered such a scheme, the Voluntary Assisted Return and
Reintegration Programme, (in conjunction with the IOM). This programme provides help with
the organising passage, and offers assistance to help returnees set up a business, gain an
education; get a job placement; or attain job training (Home Office, 2005; IOM 2008). But the
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UK’s start up and reintegration provisions have been geared solely to returning asylum seekers
and not to undocumented (or irregular migrants.) Of course, the success of any such program
will ultimately depend on the quality of support given and its ability to make a difference to real
lives, and for this the British program can be faulted. Trusted sources of information about
conditions and opportunities in the country of origin may also be of crucial importance if people
are to provided with an incentive to return (Black and Koser 1999) Nevertheless, there remains
untapped potential in return programs because they can offer precarious residents escape routes
out of exploitative situations while satisfying the desire of states to reduce the number of
unwanted residents on their territory.
A third and final reform is to open up avenues precarious residents to transfer to legal migration
status and, ultimately, citizenship. This reform would go along way to addressing the fact that
precarious residence (with its vulnerabilities and indignities) may drag on indefinitely. The case
for undertaking this reform emanates both from the need to find ways to avoid the exploitation of
precarious residents by unscrupulous employers (and others) and the recognition that states have
moral responsibilities to long term residents on their territory according to the principles of
subjection and societal membership.
There is nothing new about regularisation. Many countries have had such campaigns in the last
few decades including the US, Canada, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal
(Arango & Jachimowicz, 2005). The effect and successes of such schemes in terms of reducing
levels of unlawful migration and creating a new start for border control are highly contested. But
these practices have provided observers with a range of practical policy lessons about what
features may be essential to successful regularization programmes. It is important, for example,
that regularization campaigns are not operated in isolation from other migration control
measures. In Spain, for example, the 2004 regularization campaign was accompanied both by
“strengthened immigration enforcement mechanisms (border enforcement, workplace
inspections, and removals) and “expanded and more flexible legal avenues for economic
immigration” (Arango & Jachimowicz, 2005). It is important also that regularization is an
ongoing possibility rather than a one time only opportunity. For example, Demetrios
Papademetriou (2005) has drawn from wide-ranging knowledge of regularization campaigns to
argue that new approaches should incorporate the idea of “earned legalization” whereby migrants
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acquire points for meeting certain criteria, such as number of years in the country, have a stable
job, paying taxes, not having a criminal record, etc.
An approach liked that of “earned legalization” falls short of addressing all of the moral
problems of long term precarious residence identified in stakeholder and subjecthood theories of
membership acquisition. It would seem to allow for some long term residents to be excluded
from membership even if they had lived in the state for many years (for example, if they had a
criminal record or were out of work). They are far stricter than automatic requirement of five
years residence advocated by Joseph Carens. Nonetheless, earned citizenship would certainly
offer an improvement over recent practices of regularization that have tended to be somewhat
arbitrary and one-off affairs. They may well appeal to a skeptical audience of citizens, worried
that unlawful activity will be rewarded in regularization campaigns. Importantly, they are a
mechanism for (albeit partly) dealing with precarious residence as an ongoing problem created
by forces like globalization that are beyond the ability of any state to control.
Conclusion
I have shown in this paper that precarious residence may lead to a range of negative economic
and social effects for migrants, their dependents, and the broader societies in which they live. I
have suggested furthermore that treating some migrants simply as guests in the state violates
their moral rights to membership. Is there anything positive to be said in defence of precarious
residence?
It could be argued that limitations on access to rights, citizenship and continued are necessary if
richer states are to open their borders to migrants from developing countries.  If states are not
permitted to place restrictions on the rights of these groups entering, they will simply close their
borders further and to operate measures to prevent arrivals. A precarious status in society might
thus be seen as part of a trade off for entrance and access to protection or (legal or illegal) work.
This trade-off is clearest perhaps with guestworker migrants in the UAE. Why would these
migrants continue to enter the UAE unless their present (or future) economic condition was
improved by the work on offer (cf Martin 2008; Ruhs 2004)? The benefits of precarious
residence are also evident in the other cases we considered:  a life on the margins in the UK may
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be undesirable but it’s better than fearing for one’s life in Iraq. Life as an undocumented person
in the US may be hard, but it offers the opportunity of better wages than in Mexico.
There are limitations to this trade-off argument. As I’ve shown, precarious residents often find
themselves facing forms of exploitation and abuse they are unlikely to have anticipated before
they left their country of origin, leaving them worse off—economically, socially or
psychologically—as a result of their experience. It needs to be noted also that some of the costs
of precarious residence are felt not just by the migrants themselves but also by the broader
societies in which they reside. When exploitation in various forms flourishes, medical conditions
go unchecked, and long term residents are excluded from political recognition, it is folly to
believe that citizens can be insulated from the social consequences.
There is, however, more than a grain of truth in the trade-off argument. What makes precarious
residence a reasonable choice for many migrants is the appalling conditions on offer in the
developing countries in terms of economic opportunities or rights protection from which they
originate. If one wants to help these migrants one needs policies and practices that address these
conditions. These policies and practices need, however, to be complemented by serious steps to
make the experience of migrants less precarious, less exploitative and less dangerous.
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